The failure to depose the Rev. Dr. Cayce Ramey from the priesthood should make all Episcopalians grieve. This is not because deposition is a discipline to take lightly or because of any desire to see a clerical colleague defrocked. The reason is straightforward: Fr. Ramey’s decision is incompatible with the priesthood and is a sign of several systemic failures in our church.
In what follows, I explore in some detail the features of the case and what I see as the errors in the judgment of the Court of Review. But before doing so, I wish to offer the beginnings of a theory about what contributed to this failure. I see two main factors.
Weaknesses That Helped Enable This Failure
First, to put it simply, the sacramental theology of the prayer book tradition, most especially that expressed in the 1979 prayer book, has not been deeply received in our church. If it had been, so many of the arguments in the various hearings of Fr. Ramey’s case would have been totally different. It is often said that the 1979 prayer book expresses the triumph of the reception of the Oxford Movement in the Episcopal Church. By this, such pundits refer to the following: Eucharistic rites which expresses a theology of the Eucharist that is fully recognizable to the pre-reformation Church; ritual provision for private confession; a revised ordinal consciously based on ancient models that include a clear understanding of three distinct orders of ordained ministry with particular charisms; an ordinal and eucharistic liturgies that assume a priesthood which offers eucharistic spiritual sacrifices to God; provision for what the Western tradition called “votive Masses,” that is, celebrations of the Eucharist to commemorate particular mysteries of the faith (the Cross, the Incarnation, the ministry of the angels) or with particular intentions (for the faithful departed). The list is much longer, but you get the idea.
Anglicans love to talk as if they have special purchase on the concept of lex orandi, lex credendi (the law of prayer is the law of the belief). But of course any tradition with sacramental rites would believe this as strongly as Anglicans do. The claim is a way of acknowledging that without a magisterium like the Catholic Church or the confessional texts of the Lutheran and reformed churches, the theological content of liturgical rites takes on particular weight.
But the current Episcopal Church is a clear example of the fact that theologically correct liturgical rites do not guarantee that the people who use them understand its teachings, have studied the texts and their implications, and have been remade by the liturgical reforms. Had this formation occurred, it simply would be impossible to even imagine that a parish priest (let alone its rector) would cogently claim the possibility of “fasting” from celebrating and receiving the Eucharist.
The second factor that contributed to the failure of which Ramey’s acquittal is an example is related to the first. Canon law is, among other things, theological. Some of its provisions are practical, but that does not make them any less theological. The mystical body of Christ is both visible and invisible, and its visible expression must be ordered, and ordered well. But while all canon law is undergirded by a theological vision, some (much?) canon law is expressly theological (such as the canon that no unbaptized person shall be admitted to Holy Communion) or is an expression of theology (the presence of a canon that states that “habitual neglect of public worship, and of the Holy Communion, according to the order and use of the Church” is a fundamental violation of the vows of the priesthood (Canon IV.4.1.h(8)). Complex theological assumptions and claims underly all of this.
Furthermore, the system of canonical interpretation as it relates to English and Roman Canon law (which I will describe later in this essay) is also embedded in the case law and history of interpretation in the Episcopal Church. All this means that a lawyer in the United States who works in canon law but does not have extensive theological training and education in canon law is profoundly handicapped in Episcopal canon law. I mean no disrespect to those who do this job; I wish only to describe facts that I think are true. Only those who have no bishops will be surprised that nearly all those who become bishops in the Catholic Church have a degree in canon law. Like it or not, a great deal of the work of bishops in this church is the painstaking and difficult work of applying the practical theological tools of the canons to challenging situations and persons of a local church.
As will become clear, these factors hampered the ability of those involved in the Title IV system to aptly interpret and apply our canons as a theological tool of the church.
Maybe this will serve as an impetus to the serious reforms that are needed.
Introduction
As TLC reported July 4, 2025, “The Episcopal Church’s Court of Review has ruled in favor of the Rev. Dr. Cayce Ramey in his abstention from celebrating or receiving the Eucharist.”
The Court of Review wrote,
Nothing in our opinion condones an “anything goes” Church. We do not dispute—indeed we wholeheartedly affirm—that a priest’s unilateral decision refusal to celebrate the Holy Communion is a grave matter, rightly causing dismay in a congregation. …
Our ruling today is narrow, grounded in the specific charges made here and the evidentiary record, not in any approval of Ramey’s methods. Simply put, we conclude that the Diocese proved no Offense warranting the extreme sanction of deposition from the ordained ministry on these facts.
It is difficult for me to ascertain clearly the extent to which the Diocese of Virginia utilized the Title IV process in the best way. But what is clear is that the Hearing Panel not only failed from a legal perspective in its argumentation, but it has also failed in its theological reasoning.
Legal Failures
The Diocese of Virginia charged Ramey with the following offenses:
- Failing to “abide by the promises and vows made when ordained,” Canon IV.4.1(c);
- “[H]abitual neglect of public worship, and of the Holy Communion, according to the order and use of the Church,” Canon IV.4.1(h)(8);
- Failing “to conform to the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer,” Canon IV.4.1(b);
- Failing “to refrain from any Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Clergy,” Canon IV.4.1(h)(9).
In my estimation, the first two charges are most easily proved. Ramey also violated the third charge. But without comprehensive canon law like in the Catholic Code of Canon Law (1983), that charge is much more difficult to prove clearly. The fourth charge is, by definition, extremely broad. If the first two charges are true, they amount by definition to a violation of the fourth charge, since the failure to perform a duty constitutive of the office is necessarily “Conduct Unbecoming.”
Failure to abide by ordination vows
The first charge was interpreted as a violation of one of the vows of a priest, namely to “be guided by the leadership of your bishop” and to “minister … the sacraments of the New Covenant” (BCP, p. 532). The Court of Review claims that Ramey did not violate the vow of obedience to his bishop because without “a specific direction from the Bishop to do or refrain from doing something that is within the Bishop’s authority to direct” (p. 14), there is no violation of this vow.
In my view, the notion that the bishop’s communication with Ramey that his decision to abstain from celebrating or receiving the Eucharist was problematic (at the very least) was merely “the bishop’s preference” is strange at best. If a bishop must issue a Pastoral Directive (what used to be called a Godly Admonition, which is a formal and solemn directive that must be followed) for matters so constitutive to the priesthood, a bishop could be issuing Pastoral Directives every other day! There is nothing more constitutive of the priesthood than celebrating and receiving the Eucharist. If the bishop said anything along the lines of “I agree that racism is a huge deal and we need to address this in substantive ways … but you still need to celebrate the Eucharist in your parish,” I can’t see how the priest has any other option but to comply. Nonetheless, those who read the entire judgment of the Court of Review will see that this is one of the places where the majority and the minority disagree: namely, whether a Pastoral Directive was necessary in this case.
The clearer violation, however, is the vows that concern the celebration of the Eucharist. This is so central to the priesthood that it is referenced both directly and indirectly several times in the ordination liturgy:
- In the charge by the bishop to the candidate that serves as a preamble to the vows, the bishop states that a priest is “to share in the administration of Holy Baptism and in the celebration of the mysteries of Christ’s Body and Blood” (BCP, p. 531). The “sharing” here refers to the fact that the sacramental ministry of every priest is delegated from the bishop and thus a sharing in the ministry first belongs to the bishop as the “chief pastor” and is shared in the “high priesthood” of Christ.
- The fifth question includes the vow to “to minister the Word of God and the sacraments of the New Covenant,” one of which is the Holy Eucharist. The Bible is given to the candidate after the consecration “as a sign of the authority given to you to preach the Word of God and to administer his holy Sacraments.”
- The use of the term “priesthood” (even “sacred priesthood”; BCP, p. 527) is itself indicative of a belief that priests offer sacrifice, which is one of the ways in which the liturgy and the catechism speak of the Eucharist (BCP, p. 334-336; 342; 363; 369; 375; 859). In the prayer of consecration, the bishop prays, “May he exalt you, O Lord, in the midst of your people; offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to you” (BCP, p. 534).
- The indirect reference comes near the beginning, when the candidate is asked if he or she will “be loyal to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of Christ as this Church has received them” (BCP, p. 526).
The canons similarly emphasize the degree to which the celebration of the Eucharist is central to the priesthood. Of the nine offenses specifically listed in Canon IV.4.1.h (alongside sexual misconduct, teaching a contrary doctrine, criminal acts, fraud, etc.), one is “habitual neglect of public worship, and of the Holy Communion, according to the order and use of the Church” (Canon IV.4.1.h(8)).
Thus, if one has habitually neglected the Holy Communion, one has also failed to “abide by the promises and vows made when ordained (Canon IV.4.1.c). This is clear.
Habitual Neglect of the Holy Communion
The reasoning of the Court of Review in its response to the second (but closely related) charge—that of “habitual neglect of … the Holy Communion” (Canon IV.4.1(h)(8)) strains credulity:
Ramey regularly participated in the Eucharist by preaching, by proclaiming the Gospel, by baptizing, and by giving the dismissal, all functions normally reserved to ordained clergy. Ramey also received a blessing from other clergy while Communion was distributed. Thus, we must determine whether any law of this Church required Ramey to receive the Holy Communion other than at Easter, and whether any law of this Church required Ramey to preside at the Eucharist when other clergy were available to do so.
There are several problems here:
First, the fact that Ramey undertook liturgical duties that a deacon can also do does not speak to whether as a priest he neglected Holy Communion. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that his refusal to receive Holy Communion would make him ineligible to be categorized as “a Communicant of this Church,” were he a lay person. But he is a priest!
Second, the fact that other priests undertook their priestly duties in his presence at the parish of which he was rector has no bearing on the charges against Ramey. The question is whether Ramey habitually neglected the Holy Communion.
What other meaning of “habitual neglect” could there be beyond neither celebrating nor receiving the Holy Eucharist? If there was any question about what “habitual neglect” could mean, a quick look at the first version of this canon, enacted in 1801, makes it very clear:
If any person, having been ordained in this Church, or having been otherwise regularly ordained and admitted a minister in this Church, shall discontinue all exercise of the ministerial office without lawful cause, or shall avow that he is no longer a minister of this Church, or shall live in the habitual disuse of the public worship, or of the Holy Eucharist, according to the offices of this Church—such person, on due proof of the same, or on his own confession, shall be liable to be degraded from the Ministry (White and Dykman, p. 964).
According to this definition, there is no question that Ramey was living “in the habitual disuse … of the Holy Eucharist.” And there is clearly no “lawful cause” for Ramey’s abstention from celebrating the Eucharist and from receiving the Sacrament of Christ’s Body and Blood.
Excursus on the Principles of Interpretation of Anglican Canon Law
This opens another important and closely related issue regarding how canon law is interpreted and applied, to which I alluded in the Introduction. It is important to note that the Court of Review appeals to the Canon Law of the Church of England and the Provincial Court of the Church in Wales as precedent in order to confirm its own interpretation of what sort of obedience is required by a priest to the bishop (p. 14). In its claim that Ramey did not habitually neglect the Holy Communion, the Court of Review sets up a more stringent interpretive requirement than the canons require while simultaneously approaching the canons as if they were utterly comprehensive in the way that the Code of Canon Law in the Catholic Church is. The court’s members wrote that “we must determine whether any law of this Church required Ramey to receive the Holy Communion other than at Easter, and whether any law of this Church required Ramey to preside at the Eucharist when other clergy were available to do so.” But is this actually what is required of the Court of Review to make a proper judgment? I think not.
We must remember that Episcopal canon law is, by nature, not comprehensive. As Daniel B. Stevick explains in the last authoritative book on canon law published for the Episcopal Church:
In regard to the Church of England, the modern period in the history of canon law is termed by the Archbishop’s Report [from 1947, which can be read here], “The Period of Mixed Sources.” The term indicates that church law in England is not self-sufficient. The explicit canon law (which we have seen to be “unsystematic and out of date” is incomplete; it requires supplementation by older laws and by civil law. The law must be deduced from many sources (Stevick, Canon Law, 63).
Lest one assume that Stevick is merely giving his private view of the matter, he cites a key paragraph that was printed in the foreword of the 1954 edition of White and Dykman, the annotated and authoritative edition of the Constitution and Canons of the Episcopal Church that was directed to be compiled and then published by the General Convention. These were updated in 1976 and several times after that through 1994.
A key paragraph in that 1954 edition is printed again in the 1981 edition, with this introductory sentence: “We repeat here with approval the following paragraph which appears on page vii of the Foreword to the 1954 edition”:
Those using this book should bear in mind that the Canon Law of the Church of England and the body of tradition of the Catholic Church in England (i.e., Anglican) both before and after the Reformation is of weight in the decision of questions in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States of America, except where conditions have altered, or when the relevant regulation or custom has fallen into desuetude, or the General Convention has occupied the field by legislation. They should also bear in mind that civil cases cited in the text must be considered in the light of the civil law of the jurisdiction in which they were decided (White and Dykman, xi).
Thus, if something is unclear in our own canon law, the first place to turn is to “the Canon Law of the Church of England and the body of tradition of the Catholic Church in England [i.e., Anglican] both before and after the Reformation.”
As I already noted, the Court of Review appealed to these other bodies of law when it considered a priest’s canonical obedience to the bishop. But for some reason it failed to look to this law when it considered the most important charge, namely, the habitual neglect of Holy Communion. When the members wrote, “we must determine whether any law of this Church required Ramey to receive the Holy Communion other than at Easter, and whether any law of this Church required Ramey to preside at the Eucharist when other clergy were available to do so,” they were simply wrong.
What is required of the court is far more. Were it to have applied the principle presented so clearly in White and Dykman, it most certainly could have arrived at the opposite conclusion. Had it looked to those bodies of law, it would have found a clear answer.
Habitual Neglect of the Holy Communion, continued
The argument of the Court of Review that Ramey did not neglect the Holy Communion goes like this. The court first noted that the only direction in our canons about reception of Communion is in Canon I.17.2.a, “Of Regulations Respecting the Laity,” which states: “All Members of this Church who have received Holy Communion in this Church at least three times during the previous year are to be considered Communicants of this Church.” The Court of Review explain that this leaves it “unclear whether it fairly applies to clergy and no consequences are prescribed for failing to follow it.” It adds, “At oral argument, the parties agreed that Canon I.17.2.a does not apply to clergy. We assume, without deciding, that their view is correct. We find no other canon declaring how often clergy must receive the Holy Communion” (p. 16).
The Court of Review cites the following facts as evidence that Ramey did not neglect Holy Communion:
- His parishioners were not prevented from regularly receiving Holy Communion.
- Ramey was present at celebrations of the Holy Eucharist (though the reader should keep in mind that the plain logic of Ramey’s eucharistic “fast” is that no one should be receiving the Eucharist until, as Ramey stated, “he believed the Church was truly repentant and working towards amendment of life” of its complicity in systemic racism).
- Ramey ensured that the Eucharist was celebrated by others and even offered to pay for supply clergy. “He even received a blessing at each service and remained visibly engaged in the liturgy.”
Based on this, the Court of Review concludes that Ramey’s behavior constitutes “neglect of the Holy Communion” “stretches the term beyond recognition.”
There are several problems with this line of reasoning, with the court’s use of canon law, and thus with its conclusions.
First, the canon does prescribe consequences for not receiving Communion at least three times a year: one is no longer considered a communicant of this church.
Second, the court writes that “it is unclear whether it fairly applies to clergy.” Why the attorney for the Diocese of Virginia agreed that this canon had no bearing on the question at hand is unclear to me and, frankly, it caused significant harm to the proper adjudication of this case.
A history of this canon helps to clarify whether placing this canon in a section titled “Of Regulations Respecting the Laity” intends to exclude the clergy from this minimum and hold them to a lower standard. White and Dykman’s passage shows that this canon had its origin as a canon about excommunication. Over its history, it was amended multiple times, such that it also began to address the question of membership. In 1909, the sentence in question was added, in part to clarify who is a “communicant in good standing” (now “Communicants of this Church”).
This means that since the Episcopal Church never passed a canon about how often a cleric is required to receive Holy Communion, the clear direction of the 1603 Canons of the Church of England (this was Canon 21 in 1603, but is now Canon B15, “Of the receiving of Holy Communion”) is in force: “It is the duty of all confirmed members of the Church of England to receive the Holy Communion regularly, and especially at the festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsun [or Pentecost].” Most strangely, the Court of Review writes that “this Church could require clergy to receive the Holy Communion regularly, as some other churches do. For example, in the Church of England,” and then it quotes Canon B12.
Furthermore, when “the Canon Law of the Church of England and the body of tradition of the Catholic Church in England [i.e., Anglican] both before and after the Reformation” not only require all confirmed person to receive regularly, and in Catholic canon law to celebrate frequently (at which the priest is always required to receive, according to the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer), there is no conceivable scenario in which one could not conclude that regular reception of the Eucharist is not only normative but necessary for a priest.
Third, the Court of Review not only failed to be consistent in its recognition of the incompleteness of this church’s canon law and the requirement to utilize the principle that is given at the beginning of White and Dykman. It also fails the use of logic. Does the court really mean to argue that clerics might be held to a lower standard of sacramental reception than the laity? What possible theological argument for this could be imagined?
The Court of Review writes, “It is doubtless true that many clergy who are ill, infirm, or retired cease presiding at the Holy Communion—sometimes permanently—yet they remain clergy in good standing in our Church” (p. 16). Such scenarios have no bearing on this case, since no reasonable person would conclude that clerics in such situations were “habitually neglecting” Holy Communion: rather, they were prevented from undertaking their duties or limited because of the canonical age requirements of retirement.
The Court of Review then makes a very strange argument:
Nor did Ramey take his actions lightly. Ramey went to the Bishop and stated his intentions. At that time, Ramey was not given a Pastoral Direction. Ramey was clear that he was not neglecting his duties. Neglect implies uncaring and indifference. He did not do this. He absented himself from Holy Communion to honor the power of the Eucharist.
The Court here obfuscates the actual questions at hand.
First, the canon does not care if the decision to neglect the celebration of the Eucharist was taken lightly. The person’s internal or emotional disposition simply has no bearing.
Second, the logic of the canons does not care whether Ramey thought that he was neglecting his duties in general and the theological, moral, and canonical requirement that he celebrate the mysteries of Christ’s Body and Blood. If a secular court determines that a mentally handicapped person has neglected to adequately care for a child, the degree of awareness by the parent of the neglect is irrelevant. The concern, in that case, is for the well-being of the child. The concern in this case, is both the nature of the priesthood and the well-being of the parishioners, the latter being one of the reasons for which the priesthood exists.
The canonical standard is narrow: “habitual neglect.” Of course, central to the assumption that neglect of public worship and the Holy Communion is an offense for which one can be removed from the ministry only indicates how central it is to the priesthood and thus to the pastoral office of the priest. Such neglect would almost certainly result in spiritual harm to those in the priest’s care. But the canons are written to make neglect, not harm, the offense, precisely because it is much easier to prove the neglect than the effects of this neglect. It is based on a theological assumption that the Holy Communion is essential for the spiritual well-being of the baptized, and thus its habitual neglect is a double sin: against the priesthood and against the faithful.
The court also makes the somewhat strange claim that Ramey “absented himself from Holy Communion to honor the power of the Eucharist.” It seems to assume that Ramey has a right to honor the power of the Eucharist by neglecting his theological, moral, and canonical obligations. As I argued elsewhere, even without turning to “the Canon Law of the Church of England and the body of tradition of the Catholic Church in England [i.e., Anglican] both before and after the Reformation,” it is very clear from our canons and the Book of Common Prayer that “the celebration and the ministration of the Eucharist is constitutive of the priesthood in general, and the duty of any rector.” I wrote,
This is an essential part of this church’s theology of the priesthood. Importantly, it is theology that is not unique to this church, but is part of the “doctrine, discipline, and worship of Christ as this Church has received” it.
Remove the celebration and reception of the Eucharist from a Christian priest and you have a contradiction in terms. If a rector is only undertaking duties that can be performed by a deacon or lay person, we can only draw one conclusion: the priest is refusing to undertake tasks that are constitutive of that person’s identity as a Christian priest.
The Court of Review repeatedly creates out of whole cloth standards for “neglect” that have no basis in the canons. A key argument on page 17 deserves careful reading:
… the Diocese chose to center its case on episcopal authority and expert testimony debating the theological merits of Ramey’s Eucharistic fast. That was the Diocese’s prerogative. Our dissenting colleagues cannot fault us for the absence of evidence that the Diocese declined to present. The dissent asserts that Ramey’s conduct was “deliberate, continuous, and willful,” and therefore meets the standard for “habitual neglect.’” But this assertion rests more on rhetorical force than on the record.
Even if the diocese made poor (or even bad) arguments, the question before the court is whether it was given evidence that Ramey violated his ordination vows and engaged in “habitual neglect of the Holy Communion.”
Theological Failures
What is neglect?
The meaning of “neglect,” then, plays an enormous role in this decision. The court argues that “the canons do not prescribe a minimum frequency for celebration or reception of the Eucharist. The dissent [a minority of the members of the panel published a dissent] would have us infer a standard from theological expectations. But Title IV is not a proper vehicle for enforcing theological ideals absent canonical clarity” (pp. 16-17). The court seems to misunderstand that canon law is not simply law that is made within and for the church. It is often inexorably intertwined with theology, as I already explained.
For example, the claim in Canon I.17.7, “No unbaptized person shall be eligible to receive Holy Communion in this Church,” is at the same time a juridical discipline and an expression of a set of theological realities. These realities are not stated here, but are given expression in the liturgies for both Holy Baptism and Holy Communion in the Book of Common Prayer (and the attending rubrics and directions) and the Catechism of the prayer book, which are expressions of biblical exegesis and the reception of the body of ecclesiastical tradition—i.e., the “doctrine, discipline, and worship of Christ as this Church has received them” (BCP, p. 526, 538). One could write a journal-length article about the theology of that 13-word sentence.
Theology must always be considered when interpreting canon law. In fact, theology is the context in which canon law exists and the place from which it must be understood. Furthermore, by subtly shifting the obligations of the ordained ministry into the ideals of such (i.e., “Title IV is not a proper vehicle for enforcing theological ideals absent canonical clarity”), the court frames the regular celebration and reception of Holy Communion by a priest as a “theological ideal.”
The Court of Review claims that “neglect implies uncaring and indifference.” This is incorrect. It has chosen to interpret “neglect” in a purely emotional register. A mentally handicapped parent may not lack any emotional care for their child but nonetheless can still be neglectful. Neglect is not defined in the canons. Black’s Law Dictionary is quite helpful here: “It does not generally imply carelessness or imprudence.” Rather, it is an “omission,” the “failure to do something that one is bound to do.” The term comes from the Latin neglipentia, which concerns the refusal to pay money that a person owes.
The Eucharistic Fast
As I argued in a piece before the Court of Review issued its judgment,
… the issue at hand is not about whether Fr. Ramey can make the decision he made, but whether any priest can properly make such a response.
I have struggled to find an analogy that really works. The difficulty is that the actions and duties that are part of the priesthood are not simply tasks that correspond to a “job.” A priest doesn’t simply function as a priest; a person is made a priest. Nonetheless, these two analogies gesture toward the way that the refusal to celebrate the Eucharist gets to what is constitutive of the priesthood.
Imagine an executive who informed the board of directors that she would be fasting from meetings in 2025 because of the ways in which the company benefited in the past from chattel slavery. Or simply imagine a plumber who said that because the company that made his preferred PVC piping was complicit in the use of child labor, the plumber would not touch or fix any PVC pipes during Lent. … In both analogies, an individual is treating as optional certain actions that are simply constitutive duties of a job. This is only more so in the case of the priesthood, since it is not only a job but a state of life under the authority of Almighty God.
Conclusion
The Episcopal Church claims to be part of a fellowship within the one, holy, Catholic, and apostolic church of the creeds. I believe that to be the case, despite our profound failures and deficiencies. Such wounds have marked the church from at least the time of the Corinthian epistles.
But we must take seriously the fact that if we as a church live in habitual neglect of our canons, we are committing a terribly grave error. In fact, I will go a step further. If we choose to live in habitual neglect of our canons (and the prayer book, which has the authority of the canons), I believe we will be liable to divine judgment.
The habitual, public flouting of the canon requiring baptism for Holy Communion by bishops and priests is a Title IV offense. No Court of Review is necessary to determine this. The regular changes to the text of the liturgy for the Holy Eucharist by bishops and priests is a Title IV offense that is undertaken daily. The response “And blessed be God’s Kingdom, now and forever” is a text that has never been authorized by this Church and thus is not permitted (save for three years and only in a same-sex marriage rite—this will come as a surprise to many, but it’s true). The rubrics that require the priest to immediately receive the consecrated Body and Blood and only then distribute it to those present (e.g., one can only give what one has received) are also regularly violated every Sunday. This too is a Title IV offense.
The choice to blatantly ignore the canons and rubrics to which the clergy have vowed conformity under God and in the midst of God’s people is serious indeed. We opine about elected officials who violate the law and yet we daily flout the ecclesial law that governs our common life and call it “prophetic.”
This attitude is the third factor that contributes to the kind of failures that we can observe in the Ramey case. The theology of our prayer book has not been truly received by our church. The absence of the proper theological expertise to understand the interplay of theology and ecclesial law straightjackets our ability to properly use and interpret this canon law. And our habitual neglect to live within the boundaries within which we have vowed to live only further inoculates us to the theological and pastoral wounds inflicted by these violations.
This should move us to repentance.
The Rev. Matthew S.C. Olver, Ph.D., is the Executive Director and Publisher of the Living Church Foundation, Senior Lecturer in Liturgics at Nashotah House Theological Seminary, and a scholar of early Christian liturgy.
